M
MoPar Man
Summary:
A) Killing Plymouth was a mistake. PT Cruiser originally to be a
Plymouth, with more variants than is now currently available.
Chrysler sold more minivans when it had Plymough than it does now
under Chrysler AND Dodge. Chrysler Voyager to be axed.
B) Chrysler risks damaging the Jeep image by introducing lower-priced
(lower-capability) versions to compete with other "soft" SUV's rather
than badge them under Chrysler or Dodge. Author claims this was done
in the past by badging some cars under Chrysler rather than Plymouth,
ultimately damaging the Chrysler brand (does not mention specific
vehicle).
C) Badge-gap. "I've driven the new Pacifica and I like it. Those LX
sedans may be excellent, too. But it is still a marketing risk to push
Chrysler upscale without expanding the lower-priced lines."
D) Dealer strategy. "Merging together dealer groups
(Chrysler-Jeep-Dodge) is a defeatist strategy. Winners don't do it.
And it leads to more product eliminations. In a few years from now
Chrysler executives will wonder why dealers need to have similar
products like the Dodge Stratus and Chrysler Sebring sitting side by
side in the same showroom."
E) Continued trend of replacing American executives with German ones.
"Chrysler just changed its sales/marketing boss; it replaced an
American with another German executive. So far there's no sign that
the company will reverse any of these destructive strategies. I think
that is a mistake."
And now for the article...
----------------------
Backseat Driver
Chrysler's Marketing Mistakes
Jerry Flint, 08.05.03, 8:00 AM ET
http://www.forbes.com/2003/08/05/cz_jf_0805flint.html
NEW YORK - Let's be honest, it isn't easy being a Detroit executive in
the new millennium. The Japanese are coming on strong in light trucks,
the Koreans are gaining market share, and it's a buyer's market
dominated by profit-sapping givebacks. Compounding these problems is
Detroit's short-sighted emphasis on cutting costs at the expense of
building better cars and trucks.
All these problems are bad enough, but I think that beleaguered
Chrysler, the American division of DaimlerChrysler, has another
serious shortcoming: How it markets and sells its vehicles. I'm not
talking about whether it was a good idea to hire Grammy winner Celine
Dion to sing up Chrysler. To me, Chrysler's marketing mistakes are far
more serious.
The big issues:
1. Killing Plymouth.
2. Plans for a "sissy Jeep."
3. Moving Chrysler upscale.
4. Combining Chrysler, Dodge and Jeep showrooms.
Let's start with the Plymouth division, which was shut down by the
German managers, although there were plenty of Americans who wanted it
closed, too.
I can think of only one good reason to kill a division: when there
isn't enough money or manpower to provide a product line. That wasn't
the case here. The PT Cruiser, which was to be a Plymouth, but ended
up as a Chrysler, would have been the basis for a whole new line of
Plymouth vehicles, including a convertible, a panel truck and a sexy
two-door.
When Chrysler decided to kill Plymouth after the 2001 model year, it
re-badged the Plymouth Voyager minivan as the Chrysler Voyager. In
1999, Plymouth sold 137,000 Voyagers. Through the first six months of
2003 only 10,260 Chrysler Voyagers were sold, and it appears that this
nameplate will soon be killed. Most of these lost sales were not
captured by the upscale Chrysler Town and Country minivan: Its sales
of 68,000 are down a notch from the 70,000 sold in the first half of
last year. These lost sales weren't made up by the Dodge-version
minivans, either.
Chrysler is also in a quandary over what to do with its legendary Jeep
brand. The previous management, the Americans, made the brand Jeep
mean something. In order to wear the Jeep badge, every model had to
make it across the Rubicon Trail, a 22-mile raw northern California
trail. Only vehicles that could survive the toughest conditions--over
boulders, across water and through sand--were called Jeeps.
With all the new sport utility vehicles on the market, it is no
surprise that Jeep sales have softened since 1999, when the division
sold 555,000 trucks. Still, Jeep sold 460,000 units last year, which
is more than double the SUV sales of Toyota's Lexus division, BMW or
DaimlerChrysler's own Mercedes. But Chrysler people figure they could
sell lots more if they could make a lower-priced Jeep model--even if
it might not crawl the Rubicon. (I call it the "sissy Jeep.") And it
looks as if they will do just that.
I don't think that Chrysler should walk away from the growing market
for "softer" crossover SUVs. But such SUVS could carry the Dodge or
Chrysler name, or they could revise the old Eagle brand once used by
the firm's dealers for such lesser vehicles. Otherwise, I fear that
Chrysler runs the risk of eventually destroying the integrity of Jeep.
Over the years Chrysler did just such damage to its namesake brand. I
can remember when Chryslers were upscale, well-engineered and powerful
cars. Then management decided to build cheaper Chryslers. They took
what should have been Plymouths and called them Chryslers. Selling
such wimpy cars--some with anemic four-cylinder engines--pushed up
Chrysler sales for a couple of years, but damaged Chrysler's
reputation and ultimately ruined Plymouth.
Now Chrysler wants to move its brand upscale. This is a legitimate
goal, but one that requires great product and skillful marketing. The
drive has already started with the new Chrysler Pacifica and
Crossfire. Next spring we'll see the new LX rear-wheel-drive cars.
These vehicles will sticker for $35,000 to $40,000 or more.
The danger for Chrysler is that this strategy means finding new
customers. What about the old customers who can't afford, or are
unwilling to splurge on, these expensive new models? They may be lost.
Remember, Chrysler dealers no longer have the more affordable Plymouth
line to offer these people.
I've driven the new Pacifica and I like it. Those LX sedans may be
excellent, too. But it is still a marketing risk to push Chrysler
upscale without expanding the lower-priced lines.
Chrysler's dealer strategy also doesn't make sense to me. When the
company first merged with American Motors in the 1987, it had three
separate dealer groups: Chrysler-Plymouth, Jeep-Eagle and Dodge. Later
it merged its Chrysler and Jeep dealers, then it killed Plymouth, and
now its goal is to have 500 combined Chrysler-Jeep-Dodge showrooms in
metropolitan and suburban areas. More than 100 have been created
already.
Merging together dealer groups is a defeatist strategy. Winners don't
do it. And it leads to more product eliminations. In a few years from
now Chrysler executives will wonder why dealers need to have similar
products like the Dodge Stratus and Chrysler Sebring sitting side by
side in the same showroom.
Chrysler just changed its sales/marketing boss; it replaced an
American with another German executive. So far there's no sign that
the company will reverse any of these destructive strategies. I think
that is a mistake.
A) Killing Plymouth was a mistake. PT Cruiser originally to be a
Plymouth, with more variants than is now currently available.
Chrysler sold more minivans when it had Plymough than it does now
under Chrysler AND Dodge. Chrysler Voyager to be axed.
B) Chrysler risks damaging the Jeep image by introducing lower-priced
(lower-capability) versions to compete with other "soft" SUV's rather
than badge them under Chrysler or Dodge. Author claims this was done
in the past by badging some cars under Chrysler rather than Plymouth,
ultimately damaging the Chrysler brand (does not mention specific
vehicle).
C) Badge-gap. "I've driven the new Pacifica and I like it. Those LX
sedans may be excellent, too. But it is still a marketing risk to push
Chrysler upscale without expanding the lower-priced lines."
D) Dealer strategy. "Merging together dealer groups
(Chrysler-Jeep-Dodge) is a defeatist strategy. Winners don't do it.
And it leads to more product eliminations. In a few years from now
Chrysler executives will wonder why dealers need to have similar
products like the Dodge Stratus and Chrysler Sebring sitting side by
side in the same showroom."
E) Continued trend of replacing American executives with German ones.
"Chrysler just changed its sales/marketing boss; it replaced an
American with another German executive. So far there's no sign that
the company will reverse any of these destructive strategies. I think
that is a mistake."
And now for the article...
----------------------
Backseat Driver
Chrysler's Marketing Mistakes
Jerry Flint, 08.05.03, 8:00 AM ET
http://www.forbes.com/2003/08/05/cz_jf_0805flint.html
NEW YORK - Let's be honest, it isn't easy being a Detroit executive in
the new millennium. The Japanese are coming on strong in light trucks,
the Koreans are gaining market share, and it's a buyer's market
dominated by profit-sapping givebacks. Compounding these problems is
Detroit's short-sighted emphasis on cutting costs at the expense of
building better cars and trucks.
All these problems are bad enough, but I think that beleaguered
Chrysler, the American division of DaimlerChrysler, has another
serious shortcoming: How it markets and sells its vehicles. I'm not
talking about whether it was a good idea to hire Grammy winner Celine
Dion to sing up Chrysler. To me, Chrysler's marketing mistakes are far
more serious.
The big issues:
1. Killing Plymouth.
2. Plans for a "sissy Jeep."
3. Moving Chrysler upscale.
4. Combining Chrysler, Dodge and Jeep showrooms.
Let's start with the Plymouth division, which was shut down by the
German managers, although there were plenty of Americans who wanted it
closed, too.
I can think of only one good reason to kill a division: when there
isn't enough money or manpower to provide a product line. That wasn't
the case here. The PT Cruiser, which was to be a Plymouth, but ended
up as a Chrysler, would have been the basis for a whole new line of
Plymouth vehicles, including a convertible, a panel truck and a sexy
two-door.
When Chrysler decided to kill Plymouth after the 2001 model year, it
re-badged the Plymouth Voyager minivan as the Chrysler Voyager. In
1999, Plymouth sold 137,000 Voyagers. Through the first six months of
2003 only 10,260 Chrysler Voyagers were sold, and it appears that this
nameplate will soon be killed. Most of these lost sales were not
captured by the upscale Chrysler Town and Country minivan: Its sales
of 68,000 are down a notch from the 70,000 sold in the first half of
last year. These lost sales weren't made up by the Dodge-version
minivans, either.
Chrysler is also in a quandary over what to do with its legendary Jeep
brand. The previous management, the Americans, made the brand Jeep
mean something. In order to wear the Jeep badge, every model had to
make it across the Rubicon Trail, a 22-mile raw northern California
trail. Only vehicles that could survive the toughest conditions--over
boulders, across water and through sand--were called Jeeps.
With all the new sport utility vehicles on the market, it is no
surprise that Jeep sales have softened since 1999, when the division
sold 555,000 trucks. Still, Jeep sold 460,000 units last year, which
is more than double the SUV sales of Toyota's Lexus division, BMW or
DaimlerChrysler's own Mercedes. But Chrysler people figure they could
sell lots more if they could make a lower-priced Jeep model--even if
it might not crawl the Rubicon. (I call it the "sissy Jeep.") And it
looks as if they will do just that.
I don't think that Chrysler should walk away from the growing market
for "softer" crossover SUVs. But such SUVS could carry the Dodge or
Chrysler name, or they could revise the old Eagle brand once used by
the firm's dealers for such lesser vehicles. Otherwise, I fear that
Chrysler runs the risk of eventually destroying the integrity of Jeep.
Over the years Chrysler did just such damage to its namesake brand. I
can remember when Chryslers were upscale, well-engineered and powerful
cars. Then management decided to build cheaper Chryslers. They took
what should have been Plymouths and called them Chryslers. Selling
such wimpy cars--some with anemic four-cylinder engines--pushed up
Chrysler sales for a couple of years, but damaged Chrysler's
reputation and ultimately ruined Plymouth.
Now Chrysler wants to move its brand upscale. This is a legitimate
goal, but one that requires great product and skillful marketing. The
drive has already started with the new Chrysler Pacifica and
Crossfire. Next spring we'll see the new LX rear-wheel-drive cars.
These vehicles will sticker for $35,000 to $40,000 or more.
The danger for Chrysler is that this strategy means finding new
customers. What about the old customers who can't afford, or are
unwilling to splurge on, these expensive new models? They may be lost.
Remember, Chrysler dealers no longer have the more affordable Plymouth
line to offer these people.
I've driven the new Pacifica and I like it. Those LX sedans may be
excellent, too. But it is still a marketing risk to push Chrysler
upscale without expanding the lower-priced lines.
Chrysler's dealer strategy also doesn't make sense to me. When the
company first merged with American Motors in the 1987, it had three
separate dealer groups: Chrysler-Plymouth, Jeep-Eagle and Dodge. Later
it merged its Chrysler and Jeep dealers, then it killed Plymouth, and
now its goal is to have 500 combined Chrysler-Jeep-Dodge showrooms in
metropolitan and suburban areas. More than 100 have been created
already.
Merging together dealer groups is a defeatist strategy. Winners don't
do it. And it leads to more product eliminations. In a few years from
now Chrysler executives will wonder why dealers need to have similar
products like the Dodge Stratus and Chrysler Sebring sitting side by
side in the same showroom.
Chrysler just changed its sales/marketing boss; it replaced an
American with another German executive. So far there's no sign that
the company will reverse any of these destructive strategies. I think
that is a mistake.